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Summary
Background Performance-based ﬁ nancing can be used by global health funding agencies to improve programme 
performance and thus value for money. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was one of the ﬁ rst 
global-health funders to deploy a performance-based ﬁ nancing system. However, its complex, multistep system for 
calculating and paying on grant ratings has several components that are subjective and discretionary. We aimed to test 
the association between grant ratings and disbursements, an indication of the extent to which incentives for 
performance are transmitted to grant recipients.
Methods We obtained publicly available data for 508 Global Fund grants from 2003 to 2012 with performance ratings 
and corresponding disbursements, merged with other datasets that contained data for relevant country characteristics. 
We used regression analysis to identify predictors of grant disbursements in phase 2 (typically the latter 3 of 5 years 
of a grant), using two dependent variables: whether a grant had any phase-2 disbursements, and the phase-2 
disbursement amount. In a separate analysis, we also investigated the predictors of grant performance ratings.
Findings Grant performance rating in phase 1 was positively associated with having any disbursements in phase 2, 
but no association was seen between phase-1 ratings and phase-2 disbursement amounts. Further more, performance 
ratings are not replicable by external observers, both because subjective and discretionary decisions are made in the 
generation of performance measures and because the underlying data are not available.
Interpretation The Global Fund’s present performance-based funding system does not adequately convey incentives 
for performance to recipients, and the organisation should redesign this system to explicitly link a portion of the 
funds to a simple performance measure in health coverage or outcomes, measured independently and robustly.
Funding Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.
Introduction
The economic downturn in high-income economies has 
led to a period of stagnating or falling budgets for global 
health, which in turn has drawn attention to the need to 
obtain the best results for public funds invested—ie, to 
improve value for money.1 Achieving value for money 
depends on both choosing the mix of interventions that 
oﬀ er the best value, and making sure they are 
implemented in the most eﬃ  cient way. Global health 
funding agencies have several mechanisms that can be 
used to obtain value for money.2 One such mechanism is 
performance-based ﬁ nancing, whereby future payments 
are conditioned on predeﬁ ned performance or achieve-
ment of results. Performance-based ﬁ nancing can be 
deﬁ ned “by the transfer of money or material goods 
conditional on taking a measurable action”.3 The 
mechanism can both make donors more accountable to 
their citizens by linking payments to speciﬁ c outcomes, 
and increase the mutual accountability between the donor 
and recipient country by making contracts less ambiguous 
and focused on shared goals and measured outcomes.4 
Yet performance-based ﬁ nancing is clearly not a cure-all 
mechanism; as with other programmes, risks of un-
intended consequences and perverse eﬀ ects are present.3
Among global health funding agencies, the Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria 
(henceforth the Global Fund) has been an early innovator 
of performance-based ﬁ nancing. The Global Fund is the 
second-largest funder of HIV/AIDS treatment and the 
largest funder of tuberculosis and malaria treatment in 
the world, disbursing more than US$21 billion, including 
more than $11 billion for HIV/AIDS, since its inception 
in 2002. The Global Fund has long aspired to “link 
resources to the achievement of clear, measurable, and 
sustainable results”, while giving “due priority to the 
most aﬀ ected countries and communities, and to those 
countries most at risk”.5 The Fund relies on a “demand-
driven approach” to allocate money to “where it is most 
needed”,6 which suggests that performance is but one of 
many factors—such as disease burden, country income, 
and previous commitments—that are used to make 
allocations and disbursements. In this study, we examine 
the extent to which performance and other factors such 
as disease burden determine funding, and investigate 
the factors that determine performance.
Under the Global Fund’s ﬁ nancing model (the de-facto 
model until implementation of the New Funding Model 
begins in late 2013), country coordinating mechanisms, 
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which consisted of government and civil society 
stakeholders in eligible recipient countries, developed 
and submitted funding proposals. These proposals were 
then reviewed with respect to technical criteria by the 
Fund’s technical review panel, and subsequently 
forwarded to the Global Fund’s board for ﬁ nal approval. 
If approved by the board, grants were awarded and funds 
disbursed to country-based principal recipients, who led 
the implementation of grants. In each country, an 
independent local fund agent was contracted by the 
Global Fund to “oversee, verify, and report on grant 
performance” by the principal recipient.7
A Global Fund grant could generally last up to 5 years 
and consisted of two phases, with phase 1 being the ﬁ rst 
2 years of grant implementation, and phase 2 the 
subsequent 3 years. The amount allocated and disbursed 
in phase 2 was conditional on performance and other 
factors in phase 1. The grant would undergo a review at 
the end of phase 1, at which time the Global Fund 
assigned a rating for the grant and determined aggregate 
phase-2 funding. Each disbursement for a grant was also 
given a rating.
Using the Grant Rating Methodology, the Global Fund 
assigned a grant rating at the end of phase 1 and for each 
disbursement for the grant (ﬁ gure 1).8 Brieﬂ y, this 
multistep process generated an overall letter rating from 
several indicators (steps 1–5). This letter rating 
represented a range of potential disbursements (steps 6 
and 7). The system had a long and complex chain 
between self-reported results of individual indicators and 
ﬁ nal payment (ﬁ gure 1). Notably, in steps 5 and 7, Global 
Fund discretion had a role in mediating the linkage 
between measured results and the ﬁ nal funding amount.
In this study, we ask two questions. First, to what extent 
is future funding conditioned on the Global Fund’s 
performance metric, the grant rating? Second, what 
determines the grant rating? The ﬁ rst question asks 
whether either the continuation of funding or the 
amount of funding in phase 2 is based on the Global 
Fund’s deﬁ nition of performance and other important 
principles of the organisation, such as due priority to the 
most aﬀ ected countries. Here we deﬁ ne due priority as 
referring to both a country’s burden of disease and 
income. The second question examines the extent to 
which the Global Fund’s composite metric of 
performance is predicted by plausible factors, such as 
proportional change in numbers of disease cases, that 
might be used in calculating the composite measure of 
performance; this question attempts to investigate the 
factors linked to the grant ratings (irrespective of whether 
this metric provides a valid measure of performance).
Methods
Data sources
We pursued two diﬀ erent approaches to investigate our 
questions: regression analyses and a case study of grants 
allocated in selected countries. To construct the database 
for the regression analyses, we obtained two publicly 
available databases from the Global Fund’s website9—its 
grant-level database and its disbursement-level 
database—along with variables from other datasets. 
Table 1 presents a summary of the data used, and the 
appendix (p 5) contains information about the sources 
and deﬁ nitions for country-level variables used in the 
regression analyses. Since these databases do not include 
data for the raw indicators used to generate grant ratings, 
we complemented the main regression analyses with a 
case study. For the case study, we manually extracted 
information from all available grant scorecards for 
selected countries from the most recent Global Fund 
funding round.
The data and code that can replicate the regression 
analyses are available on the Center for Global 
Development website. We consulted with members of the 
Global Fund’s Strategy, Investment and Impact division 
on several occasions to clarify deﬁ nitions of variables in 
the databases.
Regression analyses
In the regression analyses, the ﬁ rst question of the 
correlates of overall phase-2 disbursements was tested 
separately with two diﬀ erent but related dependent 
variables. The ﬁ rst dependent variable was whether a 
grant received any phase-2 disbursement (binary), 
which is an indicator of whether a grant is continued 
into phase 2. This variable is regressed on average 
phase-1 grant rating, several grant-speciﬁ c char-
acteristics (start year of the grant, indicators of each 
principal recipient type, indicators of each local fund 
agent, and phase-1 disbursements), and country-
speciﬁ c characteristics (per-head income; government 
eﬀ ectiveness, as deﬁ ned by World Bank worldwide 
governance indicators; and disease burden, as 
measured by numbers of cases; appendix p 5). The 
equations are estimated separately for HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, and malaria, and only for grants 
Figure 1: Steps in the Global Fund’s performance-based ﬁ nancing system
*See appendix pp 1–2. †See appendix p 3. ‡See appendix p 4.
1  Percentage target 
achieved is 
calculated for each 
individual indicator
2  Two averages are calculated: 
average percentage target 
achieved (numerical rating)
for all indicators and for the
top ten indicators*
3  Each numerical average 
rating is converted to a letter 
rating; two letter ratings
are generated (one for all 
indicators and one for the 
top ten indicators)†
4  The two letter 
ratings are 
combined into 
an overall letter 
indicator
5  Letter indicator 
is manually adjusted 
on the basis of several 
factors to determine 
final grant rating‡
6  Letter grant 
rating is 
converted 
to an indicative 
disbursement
range†
7  Final amount is 
chosen manually (not 
necessarily within the 
indicative range)
For the data and code see http://
www.cgdev.org/publication/
data-set-performance-and-
payment-global-fund
See Online for appendix
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completed (ie, with the ﬁ nal phase-2 disbursement, if 
any, made) before 2012. Grants for HIV/AIDS included 
those that address both HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. 
Units of data in regression analyses were overall grants 
rather than individual disbursements.
The other dependent variable was the natural log of the 
phase-2 disbursement amount regressed on the same 
independent variables as used for the binary measure of 
any phase-2 disbursement. By using the absolute phase-2 
disbursement amount as a dependent variable, we 
assessed the extent to which performance competes with 
other factors in determining the amount of grant funding 
released to recipients (appendix pp 6–8).
To investigate the second question, we used the 
average grant rating in phase 2 as the dependent 
variable. Because each individual disbursement 
corresponds to an assigned grant rating, we did not 
restrict the sample to those grants that ended before 
2012. As a measure of relative change in disease 
burden, we used the proportional change in the number 
of cases during the phase-1 period. Since grant ratings 
are reported as letters, we mapped the letters to a 
numerical scale, with 1 corresponding to the lowest 
rating (C) and 5 to the highest rating (A1). A linear 
probability model and an ordered probit model were 
estimated separately.
Analyses of grant scorecards for selected countries
The regression analyses relied on data from publicly 
available spreadsheets from the Global Fund.9 However, 
these data did not have information about the individual 
indicators used to generate the grant ratings. By contrast, 
grant scorecards, which are the oﬃ  cial documents used 
to review phase-1 performance, have the advantage, when 
publicly available, of providing information about all 
individual indicators and their values. Thus, we 
complemented the main analysis with a case study of 
selected grant scorecards. However, the Global Fund 
does not publish all of its grant scorecards, and those that 
are available are in Adobe PDF format and many are not 
machine readable, and so cannot be automatically 
exported to a spreadsheet, hence the data have to be 
extracted manually.
For the case study, we chose the ﬁ ve countries that, as 
of Dec 10, 2012, had received the largest amount of 
funding from the Global Fund for one of the three 
diseases in the organisation’s remit. We then selected all 
available grant scorecards for the most recent funding 
round for which any scorecard was available. We used 
these scorecards to assess the linkage between the 
individual indicators and the ﬁ nal grant rating, and the 
linkage between the ﬁ nal grant rating and the phase-2 
disbursement amount.
HIV/AIDS* Tuberculosis Malaria
Phase-1 disbursements, US$ 11 600 000 (12 100 000) 5 171 000 (5 952 000) 11 500 000 (15 600 000)
Phase-2 disbursements, US$ 23 700 000 (47 000 000) 6 141 000 (10 400 000) 9 402 000 (14 000 000)
Proportion of grants that received phase-2 disbursements 0·81 (0·40) 0·79 (0·41) 0·75 (0·43)
Average phase-1 rating 3·16 (0·87) 3·24 (0·80) 2·78 (0·81)
Average phase-2 rating 3·66 (0·82) 3·63 (0·81) 3·43 (0·90)
Proportion of grants veriﬁ ed by speciﬁ c local fund agents
KPMG 0·15 (0·36) 0·12 (0·32) 0·05 (0·21)
PricewaterhouseCoopers 0·54 (0·50) 0·48 (0·50) 0·53 (0·50)
Swiss Tropical Institute 0·10 (0·31) 0·09 (0·29) 0·17 (0·38)
UNOPS 0·09 (0·28) 0·16 (0·37) 0·10 (0·30)
Other 0·12 (0·33) 0·15 (0·36) 0·15 (0·36)
Proportions of grants awarded by principal recipient type
Civil society, private sector, or third party 0·24 (0·43) 0·22 (0·42) 0·24 (0·43)
Government 0·62 (0·49) 0·62 (0·49) 0·58 (0·50)
Multilateral 0·14 (0·35) 0·16 (0·37) 0·18 (0·39)
Cases of disease in grant start year 541 593 (983 887) 271 511 (732 943) 1 349 142 (2 094 566)
Grant start year 2005 (1·9) 2006 (1·9) 2006 (1·9)
GDP per head in grant start year, US$ 1566 (1792) 1367 (1301) 1043 (1586)
THE per head in grant start year, US$ 97 (111) 97 (124) 60 (100)
DAH per head in grant start year, US$ 5·6 (5·9) 5·4 (6·1) 7·2 (7·7)
Data are mean (SD). 1090 grants and 7232 disbursements were recorded in Global Fund databases from Jan 1, 2003, to July 5, 2012. These databases were downloaded from 
the Global Fund website on July 11, 2012. Of these grants, only 508 had a recorded phase-2 disbursement (including US$0 value disbursements), 440 of which had phase-2 
grant ratings. 321 grants in the sample had both a phase-1 grant rating and a phase-2 disbursement and 383 had a phase-2 grant rating and grant-speciﬁ c characteris-
tics recorded. Data are shown for the 508 grants used in the analyses. UNOPS=United Nations Oﬃ  ce for Project Services. GDP=gross domestic product. THE=total health 
expenditure. DAH=development assistance for health. *Grants for HIV/AIDS include those that address both HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis.
Table 1: Summary statistics of grant portfolio
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Role of the funding source
The funder had no role in study design, data collection, 
data analysis, data interpretation, or writing of the report. 
The corresponding author had full access to all the data 
in the study and had ﬁ nal responsibility for the decision 
to submit for publication.
Results
When controlling for other factors, a higher grant rating is 
associated with continuation to phase 2 through renewal 
(p<0·05) for HIV/AIDS and malaria grants, but not for 
tuberculosis grants (table 2). Grants with a later start year 
were less likely to be continued into phase 2 than those 
that started earlier. 
Phase-2 disbursement amounts are not correlated with 
grant ratings, irrespective of disease. The most consistent 
predictor of phase-2 disbursement amounts across the 
three diseases is the amount of phase-1 disbursements; a 
1% increase in phase-1 disbursements is associated with 
a 1% increase in phase-2 disbursements. Additionally, 
each additional year of a grant’s start year was signiﬁ cantly 
correlated with reduced phase-2 disbursements for HIV/
AIDS, consistent with the Global Fund’s reported 
eﬃ  ciency cuts,10,11 which have led to reductions in phase-2 
funds by 10–25%.
For HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis grants, numbers of 
disease cases were signiﬁ cantly correlated with phase-2 
disbursements. For tuberculosis and malaria grants, 
having a government principal recipient was signiﬁ cantly 
associated with higher phase-2 disbursements compared 
with having a multilateral principal recipient. For 
tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS grants, grants to civil-society, 
private-sector, or third-party principal recipient were 
signiﬁ cantly associated with higher phase-2 dis-
bursements than those with a multilateral principal 
recipient. Generally, country characteristics such as 
amount of health aid, total health expenditure, and GDP 
per head were not correlated with phase-2 disbursements. 
Our results are mostly robust to diﬀ erent speciﬁ cations 
(appendix pp 9–12).
We identiﬁ ed few signiﬁ cant predictors of phase-2 grant 
ratings (table 3). Notably, neither local fund agent nor type 
of principal recipient was associated with phase-2 grant 
ratings, contrary to the ﬁ ndings of a previous study12 that 
used a dataset with fewer and earlier grants. Although we 
might expect that the grant ratings reﬂ ect changes in 
health status, our ﬁ ndings suggest that only for 
tuberculosis (but not HIV/AIDS or malaria) grants a 
decrease in prevalence is correlated with signiﬁ cantly 
increased grant ratings—a 10% decrease in prevalence was 
associated with an increase in grant rating of 0·16 on the 
numerical scale of 1–5 (C to A1), compared with a mean of 
3·6 (ie, a 4% increase). For HIV/AIDS grants, countries 
with lower incomes and higher health spending per head 
tended to achieve higher grant ratings.
In our analysis of information manually extracted from 
grant scorecards of selected countries, at least 42% of 
grants had ﬁ nal phase-2 amounts that were outside the 
expected indicative disbursement range derived from the 
grant rating, suggesting manual adjustment by Global 
Any phase-2 disbursements Ln(phase-2 disbursements)
HIV/AIDS* Tuberculosis Malaria HIV/AIDS* Tuberculosis Malaria
Average phase-1 rating 0·098 (0·045)† 0·003 (0·053) 0·174 (0·068)† –0·023 (0·166) 0·111 (0·098) –0·192 (0·207)
Ln(phase-1 disbursements) 0·012 (0·045) 0·033 (0·041) 0·079 (0·053) 1·052 (0·135)‡ 0·729 (0·152)‡ 0·874 (0·127)‡
Local fund agent§
KPMG –0·172 (0·138) 0·243 (0·143) 0·054 (0·123) –0·116 (0·391) –0·036 (0·296) 0·170 (0·282)
PricewaterhouseCoopers –0·076 (0·081) –0·013 (0·086) 0·034 (0·110) –0·361 (0·193) –0·059 (0·241) –0·064 (0·229)
Principal recipient¶
Civil society, private sector, or third party 0·254 (0·124)‡ –0·110 (0·137) –0·010 (0·185) 0·762 (0·345)† 0·904 (0·318)‡ 0·953 (0·431)†
Government 0·138 (0·126) 0·172 (0·155) 0·140 (0·181) 0·453 (0·303) 0·735 (0·328)† 1·124 (0·336)‡
Number of disbursements in phase 1 –0·022 (0·024) 0·029 (0·026) –0·028 (0·030) –0·105 (0·052)† –0·022 (0·063) –0·150 (0·077)
Grant start year –0·131 (0·024)‡ –0·157 (0·029)‡ –0·151 (0·037)‡ –0·194 (0·075)† 0·318 (0·166) –0·204 (0·102)
Government eﬀ ectiveness in grant start year 0·003 (0·086) –0·070 (0·124) –0·166 (0·121) –0·563 (0·224)† –0·401 (0·322) –0·366 (0·283)
Ln(GDP per head) in grant start year 0·149 (0·113) 0·124 (0·140) 0·139 (0·146) –0·033 (0·191) 0·558 (0·327) 0·156 (0·256)
Ln(THE per head) in grant start year –0·152 (0·112) –0·132 (0·113) –0·011 (0·140) 0·065 (0·208) –0·511 (0·367) –0·105 (0·269)
Ln(DAH per head) in grant start year 0·049 (0·037) 0·056 (0·038) 0·049 (0·041) 0·040 (0·111) –0·058 (0·103) –0·185 (0·115)
Cases of disease in grant start year (in millions) –0·004 (0·056) –0·004 (0·082) –0·047 (0·029) 0·249 (0·121)† 0·279 (0·117)† 0·120 (0·061)
Constant 261·854 (48·741)‡ 314·938 (58·142)‡ 301·856 (74·736)‡ 388·022 (149·057)† –636·348 (332·153) 410·125 (203·309)
n 112 79 71 79 51 47
R² 0·392 0·509 0·455 0·668 0·718 0·737
Data are regression coeﬃ  cient (SE), apart from in bottom two rows, where only the coeﬃ  cient is listed. Sample is restricted to grants that ended before 2012. Sources and deﬁ nitions of variables are available in 
the appendix (p 5). GDP=gross domestic product. THE=total health expenditure. DAH=development assistance for health. *Grants for HIV/AIDS include those that address both HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. 
†p<0·05. ‡p<0·01. §Reference category for local fund agent is Swiss Tropical Institute, United Nations Oﬃ  ce for Project Services, and other. ¶Reference category for principal recipient is multilateral. 
Table 2: Predictors of phase-2 disbursements
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Fund staﬀ  (ﬁ gure 2, appendix p 13). A third of grant ratings 
themselves were also subject to manual adjustment, since 
the letter ratings were not within the range expected on the 
basis of the combined results for individual indicators 
(appendix p 14). These results corroborate the main 
ﬁ ndings from our regression analyses.
Discussion
The results from both the regression analyses and the 
scorecard case study suggest that, as expected, diﬀ erent 
factors aﬀ ect phase-2 funding. Global Fund grant ratings 
in phase 1 were associated with having any phase-2 
disbursement for some grants. At least for HIV/AIDS 
and malaria grants, grant ratings were correlated with 
whether a grant continued in phase 2, suggesting that 
the organisation has been using its authority to reallocate 
funds from non-performing grants. Two possible (and 
not mutually exclusive) reasons could account for why 
some grants did not continue into phase 2 (ie, had zero 
disbursements in phase 2): truly non-performing grants 
were discontinued; or grants with poor performance 
were discontinued for political or ﬁ nancial reasons. 
Phase-2 disbursement amounts were not associated with 
phase-1 grant ratings, but the most consistently 
signiﬁ cant determinant was phase-1 funding. Thus, the 
probability of grants continuing to phase 2 might be 
aﬀ ected by performance, but disbursement amounts in 
phase 2 were not correlated with performance measures 
(panel). The results also show that disease burden is 
correlated with phase-2 disbursement amount, 
suggesting that the Global Fund is giving priority to 
countries with greater disease burdens.
Moreover, the Global Fund’s average grant ratings in 
phase 2 were (encouragingly) not correlated with any 
Linear probability model Ordered probit model
HIV/AIDS* Tuberculosis Malaria HIV/AIDS* Tuberculosis Malaria
Ln(phase-1 disbursements) 0·043 (0·073) 0·008 (0·095) –0·150 (0·129) 0·025 (0·102) 0·007 (0·131) –0·196 (0·134)
Local fund agent†
KPMG –0·415 (0·253) 0·104 (0·277) 0·261 (0·413) –0·583 (0·346) 0·164 (0·363) 0·349 (0·579)
PricewaterhouseCoopers 0·026 (0·155) –0·074 (0·192) –0·076 (0·224) 0·026 (0·211) –0·088 (0·231) –0·103 (0·268)
Principal recipient‡
Civil society, private sector, or third party 0·440 (0·199)§ 0·165 (0·286) 0·139 (0·322) 0·570 (0·348) 0·152 (0·404) 0·230 (0·405)
Government –0·105 (0·202) –0·095 (0·215) 0·003 (0·294) –0·258 (0·326) –0·178 (0·357) 0·0786 (0·380)
Number of disbursements in phase 1 0·042 (0·040) 0·057 (0·041) 0·000 (0·072) 0·065 (0·053) 0·079 (0·058) 0·004 (0·078)
Grant start year –0·059 (0·059) –0·011 (0·057) 0·089 (0·085) –0·079 (0·075) 0·001 (0·079) 0·103 (0·096)
Government eﬀ ectiveness in grant start year 0·282 (0·182) 0·366 (0·243) 0·392 (0·297) 0·494 (0·231)¶ 0·534 (0·315) 0·494 (0·362)
Ln(GDP per head) in grant start year –0·557 (0·184)¶ –0·210 (0·231) –0·474 (0·346) –0·826 (0·282)§ –0·261 (0·329) –0·597 (0·392)
Ln(THE per head) in grant start year 0·578 (0·188)¶ 0·143 (0·238) 0·208 (0·322) 0·821 (0·283)§ 0·164 (0·292) 0·280 (0·362)
Ln(DAH per head) in grant start year –0·189 (0·074)¶ –0·073 (0·074) –0·022 (0·088) –0·265 (0·099)§ –0·112 (0·109) –0·039 (0·112)
Proportional change in numbers of cases of disease during phase 1 0·165 (0·233) –1·641 (0·762)§ –0·275 (0·168) 0·193 (0·234) –2·372 (1·197)¶ –0·316 (0·242)
Constant 122·423 (118·173) 27·105 (115·159) –170·686 (168·710) ·· ·· ··
Number of grants 137 98 85 137 98 85
R²|| 0·258 0·164 0·137 0·045 0·028 0·0271
Data are regression coeﬃ  cient (SE), apart from bottom two rows, where only the coeﬃ  cient is listed. Sources and deﬁ nitions of variables are available in the appendix (p 5). GDP=gross domestic product. THE=total 
health expenditure. DAH=development assistance for health. *Grants for HIV/AIDS include those that address both HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. †Reference category for local fund agent is Swiss Tropical Institute, 
United Nations Oﬃ  ce for Project Services, and other. ‡Reference category for principal recipient is multilateral. §p<0·05. ¶p<0·01. ||Data for ordered probit model are pseudo-R2 values. 
Table 3: Predictors of phase-2 ratings
Figure 2: Indicative disbursement ranges and disbursement amounts obtained for selected grants
Bars show the indicative disbursement ranges, and red squares show the actual phase-2 disbursement amounts. 
One malaria grant for Tanzania (TNZ-809-G11-M) is not shown because it received a negative disbursement. 
TRP=technical review panel. DRC=Democratic Republic of the Congo.
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other grant variables, but were associated with selected 
country characteristics such as income and health 
spending. Our case study of selected grants further 
suggests that the ratings generated from individual 
indicators are not easily replicated, and that manual 
adjustments of both grant ratings and disbursement 
amounts conditional on the ﬁ nal chosen grant rating 
occur frequently.
The fact that these ratings cannot be replicated without 
the underlying data, let alone the various discretionary 
factors and decisions involved, shows that grant ratings 
are very much a black box to the public, and probably 
even to those most aﬀ ected—ie, the countries and 
principal recipients. By having so many indicators used 
to calculate the composite grant rating and various 
discretionary factors, the Global Fund risks not leveraging 
performance-based ﬁ nancing to improve performance. 
Our results suggest that the incentives transmitted from 
the Global Fund to its recipients are weak at best. 
Questions can be raised about how the Global Fund can 
on the one hand reallocate resources from non-
performing grants to performing grants, while on the 
other build capacity in countries with non-performing 
grants—two aspirations of the Global Fund’s per-
formance-based ﬁ nancing system.
The perceptions of principal recipients seem to accord 
with the results of our statistical analyses. According to 
the results of a 2013 Aidspan survey,14 only 34% of 
principal recipients believe that “the grant rating system 
accurately reﬂ ects performance”. If principal recipients 
do not believe that performance is accurately measured 
or tied to future disbursements, performance-based 
ﬁ nancing incentives will not have the desired eﬀ ect to 
motivate better health outcomes. Further work is 
needed through qualitative research with principal 
recipients and Global Fund managers to better 
understand the types of incentives (or disincentives) 
transmitted from the present system, and the extent to 
which the present system motivates improved 
performance. Questions can be raised about the extent 
to which national-level incentives can align incentives 
within the country, and how unintended, if not perverse, 
outcomes can be generated by a focus on inputs and 
outputs as performance measures, or by poorly 
measured in dicators.15 
One major argument of the Global Fund in explaining 
the complexity of the ﬁ nancing system is that funding is 
determined by several diﬀ erent factors, not only 
performance. We agree that relying on several factors is 
both reasonable and expected, especially where continued 
funding is a matter of life and death (ie, so-called ethical 
commitments to ensure continuity of services).16 
However, performance-based ﬁ nancing can be 
compatible with ethical commitments if the direct and 
explicit linkage occurs for only a portion of funds. Since 
few examples of donor agencies using donor-to-country 
performance-based ﬁ nancing exist, the Global Fund 
should assess the few existing systems in operation 
currently—the Inter-American Development Bank’s 
Salud Mesoamerica, the World Bank’s Health Results 
Innovation Trust Fund, and the GAVI Alliance’s 
performance-based ﬁ nancing system.17 In all of these 
systems payments are explicitly linked to observed 
performance—but for a portion of funding, not the total 
ﬁ nanced amount.
Although immunisation services are quite diﬀ erent 
from services for HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, 
the Global Fund should look to its sister organisation, the 
GAVI Alliance, to learn from its implementation of 
performance-based ﬁ nancing. GAVI approved a new 
performance-based funding scheme in November, 2011, 
and has begun to roll it out.17 The scheme has several key 
features. In the ﬁ rst year, countries will receive the full 
amount as an upfront investment from GAVI. In 
subsequent years, a portion of the payment will be based 
on improvements in immunisation outcomes. This 
outcomes-based portion will be used as a reward rather 
than a penalty. Moreover, GAVI also focuses its 
performance measurement on downstream coverage 
measures, rather than upstream indicators of product 
purchases, distribution, or training. Finally, in the past 
GAVI relied on problematic self-reported data that led to 
the perverse outcome of over-reporting by countries.18,19 
However, GAVI has redesigned its performance-based 
ﬁ nancing system to move towards the use of survey-
based estimates in some countries.17
Panel: Research in context
Systematic review
We searched PubMed and EconLit for all articles containing the term “Global Fund” in 
either the title or the abstract. We manually reviewed all identiﬁ ed abstracts and selected 
relevant articles. We also manually reviewed reference lists of all identiﬁ ed articles. We 
selected studies that speciﬁ cally addressed performance-based ﬁ nancing and resource 
allocation at the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. We noted several 
reports, particularly those by Lu and colleagues13 and Radelet and Siddiqi,12 that partly 
addressed this topic, but used earlier data and a more restrictive scope than we have 
adopted (eg, Radelet and Siddiqi12 only examined the determinants of grant ratings, and 
did not look at the relation between grant ratings and disbursement amounts). The 
existing evidence identiﬁ ed several important predictors of Global Fund grant ratings, 
including type of principal recipient and recipient country characteristics. However, the 
evidence also suggested the possibility of subjectivity and bias in the grant rating process.
Interpretation
Our ﬁ ndings add to the existing evidence base by providing information about the relation 
between grant performance and disbursements, and thus the eﬀ ectiveness of performance-
based ﬁ nancing at the Global Fund as an incentive mechanism. The Global Fund’s existing 
performance-based ﬁ nancing system provides only a weak link between grant performance 
and disbursement amounts, and thus is unlikely to transmit performance incentives to 
funding recipients. The cumulative evidence base suggests that the Global Fund should revise 
its performance-based ﬁ nancing processes to create a more explicit link between clearly 
deﬁ ned performance and at least a portion of disbursements. Such a move would help to 
reduce opportunities for bias and subjectivity, and thus improve the predictability of resource 
ﬂ ows and the strength of performance incentives encountered by funding recipients.
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Similarly, the Global Fund should shift to key measures 
of health coverage and health outcomes, and make 
payments on the basis of individual measures of 
performance rather than on composite measures of 
performance. Although the organisation recently 
announced an increased emphasis on these downstream 
outcomes in its existing performance-based ﬁ nancing 
system,20 it still does not directly link payment to speciﬁ c 
performance measures. By moving away from many to 
fewer indicators, from upstream to downstream 
indicators, from payments linked to composite indicators 
to those linked to speciﬁ c indicators, and from self-
reported to robustly measured data, the Global Fund’s 
redesigned performance-based ﬁ nancing system could 
transmit stronger incentives and have greater value for 
money than it does at present.
In view of the many alternative models for the design of 
performance-based ﬁ nancing, we recommend that the 
Global Fund explore diﬀ erent design features. Speciﬁ cally, 
as the Global Fund’s New Funding Model is implemented, 
the organisation should pilot and gradually scale up a 
simpliﬁ ed version of performance-based ﬁ nancing in 
selected countries, where performance is explicitly linked 
to a portion of funds (eg, 10–20% of the total grant 
amount). For this portion, payments should be based on 
one or more clear and easy-to-understand measures of 
performance based on core outputs and outcomes—eg, 
US$400 per additional person-year of antiretroviral 
therapy provided at a minimum quality standard.2 Finally, 
the redesigned system should use independent and 
robust performance measurement,2 and the organisation 
should track and assess the implementation of such 
modiﬁ cations, particularly with respect to understanding 
how these national-level incentives can potentially spur 
within-country incentives to change.
The Global Fund’s New Funding Model should be 
lauded for adopting an allocation formula that will 
explicitly take into account disease burden and income in 
the allocation of absolute amounts of funding.21 However, 
its incorporation of performance as a factor into its 
allocations is secondary to its focus on income or disease 
burden. Since funding cycles are iterative and funding 
decisions for a country occur several times, incentives 
exist that can aﬀ ect how funding is allocated. For 
example, by paying more to countries with higher disease 
burden, the de-facto incentive is to report a higher 
disease burden to generate greater funding. By contrast, 
if the Global Fund were also to use performance and 
results to allocate funding, then the de-facto incentives 
will align performance with payment. The New Funding 
Model will also have two funding streams, one called 
indicative funding (for which the allocation formula will 
be applied), and another called incentive funding. 
Although their roles in the New Funding Model have yet 
to be ﬁ nalised, both could be used in part to provide the 
additional portion of funds needed for a redesigned 
performance-based ﬁ nancing system.
For more on the Value for 
Money for Global Health 
Funding Agencies Working 
Group see http://www.cgdev.
org/page/value-money-agenda-
global-health-funding-agencies
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